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The federal patent laws grant to every "patentee, his heirs or assigns, for
the term of seventeen years... the right to exclude others from making, using,
or selling the [patented] invention throughout the United States .... " The
law goes on to define an infringer as anyone who "without authority makes,
uses, or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term
of the patent.... . 2 The statutory language seems to be unequivocal: a paten-
tee has an unqualified right to exclude others from "making, using, or selling"
the patented invention, and if anyone is found to have made, used, or sold the
patented invention, he or she is liable to the patentee, as an infringer, for
damages not "less than a reasonable royalty."3
The purpose of this Note is to examine the scope of a judicially created
exception to the normal infringement rule, commonly known as the "experimen-
tal use" exception. The exception allows for the unlicensed construction and
use of a patented invention under certain circumstances.4 Recently, some legal
practitioners and scholars have presented arguments favoring broad application
of the exception to attempts by innovators both to "design-around" and improve
upon existing patents.5 Moreover, a group of Representatives has expressed
an interest in codifying this expansive view of the exception as evidenced by
1. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988).
4. This exception was created by Justice Story in Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass.
1813) (No. 17,600). See infra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
5. Israelsen, Making, Using, Selling Without Infringing: An Examination of 35 U.S.C. Section 271(e)
and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 16 AM. INTELL. PRoP. L.A.QJ. 457, 475
(1989), presents a framework for the expanded application of the experimental use exception (emphasis
added):
[Tihe goals of the patent system are furthered by permitting at least the following activities,
regardless of commercial motivation and the ultimate financial impact on the patentee. .. (c)
development and patenting, but not commercialization, of improvement inventions; and (d)
designing around patented inventions.
Israelsen's call for an expansive application is voiced by all of the recent commentators on the subject.
See Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PIrr. L. REv. 959, 1017-19 (1986); Eisenberg, Propri-
etary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J 177, 218-25 (1987);
Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
617 (1985); Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and Controversial
Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1073-74 (1988).
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introduction of the Research, Experimentation, and Competitiveness Act of
19906 in the House. In contrast to these recent attempts to broaden the excep-
tion, this Note evaluates the breadth of the exception and suggests that it should
be applied as it has been in the past: in a very restrictive manner, consistent
with the purpose and function of the patent system.
Although the judicial history of the exception is, at best, indeterminate on
the question of its precise scope, the courts generally have applied the exception
restrictively. Policy arguments that have been put forth to justify expansive
application of the exception to design-around and improvement attempts are
deficient. Because they are premised on an inaccurate assessment of the objec-
tives of the patent system, these arguments fail to consider the general incen-
tives that innovators have to share the fruits of their discoveries with one
another.
Given the complexity and the subtleties of the innovation process,7 it is
unwise to empower the federal courts indiscriminately to apply a broad experi-
mental use exception. Part I of this Note will present a history of the exception
in order to delineate its contours. Part II will examine the policy justifications
that counsel against an expansive application and will explore the incentives
innovators have to share their discoveries with one another. Part III will
conclude by suggesting that an expansive experimental use exception is unwar-
ranted and that the recent concerns prompting the call for a broad exception
can be better addressed through focused congressional inquiries directed toward
industry-specific solutions.
I. HISTORY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION
The right to exclude, as announced in the federal patent laws, is not abso-
lute. Courts have occasionally recognized the experimental use exception as a
defense to a charge of infringement.
A. Justice Story's Analysis
In the 1813 decision of Whittemore v. Cutter,8 Justice Story, sitting on the
Federal Circuit Court of Massachusetts in an appellate capacity, created the
experimental use exception. In this case, the defendant appealed ajury instruc-
6. H.R. 5598, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 401-03 (1990). See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
7. At the outset, it is crucial to note a distinction between two terms that are used frequently throughout
this Note; they are "invention" and "innovation." As one author put it:
An invention refers to the practical implementation of the inventor's idea... [It] is more than
a concept (it is usually a tangible thing), but less than the fully worked out product or process
first offered for sale to customers. An innovation is the "debugged" and functional version of the
invention: the version first offered for sale.
Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L REV.
805, 807 (1988) (foomote omitted; emphasis in original).
8. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
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tion, which stated in part that the "making of a machine... with a design to
use it for profit" constituted infringement. 9 Justice Story upheld the trial
judge's instruction regarding the nature of infringement, and indicated further
that the "use for profit" requirement actually favored the defendant because
it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man,
who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments,
or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to
produce its described effects. 10
Later that same year, Justice Story elaborated on this exception to infringe-
ment in Sawin v. Guild." In this case, a patentee brought an infringement
action against a deputy sheriff for seizing and selling three patented nail cutting
machines to satisfy a judgment debt of the plaintiff/patentee. In holding that
the deputy's actions did not constitute infringement, Justice Story, in dicta,
remarked:
[T]he making of a patented machine to be an offense... must be the
making with an intent to use for profit, and not for the mere purpose
of philosophical experiments, or to ascertain the verity and exactness
of the specification .... 12
Thus, Justice Story viewed this exception to infringement as having two
components: (1) the activity must not be performed with the intent to gain
profit and (2) the activity must be either (a) for philosophical experiments or
(b) for ascertaining the verity and exactness of the specification. 3
Justice Story's formulation of the exception has been the subject of some
academic debate. Commentators present a range of views both as to what
Justice Story meant to accomplish by the creation of the experimental use
exception and as to the appropriate application of the exception.14 These
9. Id. at 1121.
10. Id (emphasis added).
11. 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
12. Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
13. Hantman, supra note 5, at 620, suggests this interpretation of Justice Story's formulation.
14. Richard Bee has written:
The only explanation for the experimental use exception which seems to make any sense is that
Justice Story, after a brief reflection on the matter, simply felt that the plain language of the
statute [the Patent Act of 1793] could not have really been intended to cover the case of a man
sitting at home in his parlor or basement workshop and tinkering around with a piece of apparatus
as a "philosophical experiment" and, hence, that this case should be simply an exception to the
rights granted the patentee.
Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of Patent Infringement, 39 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 357, 367 (1957). Donald
Chisum has indicated that the phrase "philosophical inquiry" probably had a different meaning when Justice
Story created the experimental use exception than it carries today. In his view, philosophical inquiry was
likely to have meant research directed at developing new technologies. Chisum, supra note 5, at 1019 n.203.
Chisum does not elaborate on this, and we are left to wonder from what sources he draws such a conclusion.
Rebecca Eisenberg has interpreted Justice Story's "philosophical experiments" differently, writing, "[t]he
first prong of Justice Story's experimental use privilege, permitting 'philosophical experiments,' is not well
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commentators rely on case law and policy analysis to make their arguments.
Critical evaluation of these arguments reveals that case law is indeterminate
on the question of the appropriate application of the exception. In addition, the
policy justifications proffered are simplistic, failing to consider the incentives
parties have to innovate and share their discoveries with one another. To this
point, scholarship considering the experimental use exception provides little
valuable guidance as to its appropriate application.
B. Case Law Construing the Exception
Analysis of the case law construing Justice Story's formulation reveals a
history of restrictive application of the experimental use exception by the courts.
Many of the cases present a common scenario in which an alleged infringer
uses the patented invention to test the potential applicability of the invention
to his business. In these cases, courts have sustained the defense of experimen-
tal use to charges of infringement only when the alleged infringer realized no
economic gain from the experimental activity. t5 When the experimenter has
profited in some manner by his experimental use, the courts have found in-
fringement. t6
When they have allowed the experimental use defense, courts have inade-
quately detailed their reasons for upholding the defense. While case law is
unclear as to when courts should apply the exception, it is apparent that courts
have rarely sustained the pleas for experimental use.17 Courts rely on phrases
like "experimental activity" and lack of "direct economic gain" to justify their
allowances of the exception but have not defined these phrases with any
particularity. The case law simply is ambiguous as to what conditions are
necessary for allowance of experimental use as a defense. Chesterfield v. United
defined in the cases, but it seems to permit subsequent researchers to use the patented invention at least
in traditional basic research with no commercial implications." Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 224.
15. See, e.g., Le Clair v. Shell Oil Co., 183 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Ill. 1960) (defendant's limited use of
"data logger" to determine whether device could be applied to defendant's business found to be non-
infringing); Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305,333 (N.D.W. Va. 1937) ("experimental
testing by defendant [of the patented invention] for a brief period before going into commercial production
... was not in law an act of infringement as marbles were not commercially sold.").
16. See, e.g., Spray Refrigeration Co. v. Sea Spray Fishing, Inc., 322 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1963); Clerk
v. Tannage Patent Co., 84 F. 643 (3d Cir. 1898); Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Henkel Corp., 545 F. Supp.
635 (D. Del. 1982); Northill, Co. v. Danforth, 51 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Cal. 1942); Radio Corp. of Am. v.
Andrea, 15 F. Supp. 685 (E.D.N.Y. 1936); Pairpearl Prod., Inc. v. Joseph H. Meyer Bros., 58 F.2d 802 (D.
Me. 1932); National Meter Co. v. Thomson Meter Co., 106 F. 531 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900); United States Mitis
Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 89 F. 343 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898), aff'd without opinion, 90 F. 829 (3d Cir. 1898);
Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. Derboklow, 87 F. 997 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1898); Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas.
1048 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279); Poppenhusen v. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co., 19 F. Cas.
1059 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1858) (No. 11,283).
17. See cases cited supra note 16.
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States18 and Finney v. United States, 9 two experimental use cases involving
the government, are illustrative of the deficient analysis applied by the courts.
In Chesterfield, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant's use of several
cobalt-nickel alloys infringed two of its patents. After ruling that both patents
were invalid," the Court of Claims unnecessarily addressed the infringement
issue. Concluding that none of the government's activity would have constituted
infringement had the patents been valid, the court remarked: "the evidence
shows that a portion of the... alloy procured by the defendant was used only
for testing and for experimental purposes, and there is no evidence that the
remainder was used other than experimentally."21 Unfortunately, the court goes
no further to identify the experimental activity or to specify which of those
activities qualified as experimental.
In Finney, the court took a different approach to experimental use, which
again fails to clarify the ambiguity surrounding this defense. In this case, NASA
used a patented velcro glove once during a training experiment for the Apollo
XIV mission. The court concluded that "the doctrine of de minimis non curat
lex [the law is not concerned with trifles] applies." On the basis of this de
minimis notion, several other courts have either declined to find infringement
or have failed to order an injunction or to award damages.23
In sum, the relevant case law reveals that courts have narrowly construed
the experimental use exception. When they have allowed the exception, courts
have provided little insight into their reasons and have been conclusory in their
justifications for allowing the experimental use defense.' A de minimis ratio-
nale underlies the reasoning of some of the decisions in which the courts have
upheld the defense, z5 while the particular facts of the case may explain other
decisions.26 In addition, courts have been very wary of allowing the experi-
mental use exception when the experimenting party has had a "business pur-
18. 159 F. Supp. 371 (CL C1. 1958).
19. 188 U.S.P.Q. 33 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1975).
20. For a discussion of the necessary elements for patent validity, see infra note 63.
21. 159 F. Supp. at 375.
22. 188 U.S.P.Q. at 35.
23. See. e.g., Maxon Premix Burner Co. v. Eclipse Fuel Eng'g Co., 471 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973); Condenser Corp. of Am. v. Micamold Radio Corp., 145 F.2d 878 (2d Cir.
1944); Morpul, Inc. v. Crescent Hosiery Mills, 265 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). See also Albright v.
Celluloid Harness-Trimming Co., 1 F. Cas. 320, 323 (C.C.D.NJ. 1877) (No. 147) (finding infringement
and enjoining further infringing activity, but declining to award compensation "as no damage or profits have
been shown or suggested").
24. See, e.g., Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371 (Ct. CI. 1958); Finney v. United States,
188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 33 (Trial Div., Ct. CI. 1975).
25. See cases cited supra note 23.
26. See, e.g., Kaz Mfg. v. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aft'd, 317 F.2d
679 (2d Cir. 1963) (refusing to find infringement, even though defendant had used hybrid combination of
plaintiff's patented vaporizers in television commercial, because defendant legitimately purchased vaporizers
on open market).
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pose" or has benefited commercially from the unlicensed use of the patented
invention.27
C. Legislation and Its Effects Upon the Experimental Use Exception
Prior to 1984, only the courts had addressed the issue of the scope of the
experimental use exception. The passage of the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Restoration Act)s marked the first
congressional effort to except certain experimental activities from the purview
of the patent infringement provisions. The Restoration Act, which creates an
exception to the normal infringement rule for parties applying for FDA approval
for generic medical equivalents before the end of the patent term, effectively
nullified the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit29 in
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.30
In Roche, the Federal Circuit considered the experimental use defense for
the first time. Here, the defendant, Bolar, wished to market a generic version
of a patented drug. Because FDA approval of a drug for marketing "can take
more than two years," Bolar procured a quantity of the drug from a foreign
manufacturer and "immediately began its effort to obtain federal approval to
market its generic version of [the patented drug]. ' 31 The Federal Circuit over-
ruled the district court's finding of non-infringement, 32 determining that the
experimental use exception did not apply in this case. The Federal Circuit held
that the exception did not reach "the limited use of a patented drug for testing
and investigation strictly related to FDA drug approval requirements during the
last 6 months of the term of the patent .... -"3 As part of its reasoning, the
Federal Circuit remarked:
Bolar's intended "experimental" use is solely for business reasons and
not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry.... Bolar may intend to perform "experiments," but unlicensed
experiments conducted with a view to the adaption of the patented
27. E.g., Spray Refrigeration Co. v. Sea Spray Fishing, Inc., 322 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1963) (defendant's
use of plaintiff's patented method for freezing fish constituted infringement when process was used during
commercial fishing voyages); Clerk v. Tannage Patent Co., 84 F. 643 (3d Cir. 1898) (defendant's use of
patented process for tanning hides and skins for nine months constituted infringement); Cimiotti Unhairing
Co. v. Derboklow, 87 F. 997 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1898) (defendant's use of two patented pelt-dehairing machines
for nearly three years found to be infringing); see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
28. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1988)).
29. The Federal Circuit, which has jurisdiction over all appeals in cases "arising under" the federal
patent laws, was established in 1982 by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1295
(1982).
30. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
31. Id. at 860.
32. Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 572 F Supp. 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 733
F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
33. 733 F.2d at 861.
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invention to the experimentor's business is a violation of the rights of
the patentee to exclude others from using his patented invention.'
In a later case, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., the Federal Circuit
explicitly recognized that Congress had legislatively overturned Roche." In
this case, Lilly sued Medtronic for infringement of claims, which Lilly alleged
covered certain implantable cardioverter defibrillators. Medtronic countered by
claiming that its development of such devices before the end of the patent term
fell within the exception created by the Restoration Act. In ruling that the
development of medical devices did fall within the authority the Restoration
Act, the court commented:
[I]t simply makes no sense to apply Roche as precedent to nondrug
products when the case has no precedential value as to the specific
products of the Roche suit .... We can only conclude that Congress
intended the enactment of section 271(e)(1) [which codifies the Restora-
tion Act] to set aside the Roche interpretation of section 271(a) [defining
infringement] in all of its ramifications.36
Despite this later disclaimer by the Federal Circuit, it is important to note
that in the absence of an explicit legislative mandate, the Federal Circuit
presented restrictive dicta in Roche concerning the experimental use exception.
Thus, the Roche decision and reasoning can be read to reflect the Federal
Circuit's general view that the exception should be narrowly construed 7 To
date, no court has had the opportunity to rule on an experimental use case in
light of the Federal Circuit's repudiation of its Roche ruling.
Recently proposed legislation, the Research, Experimentation, and Compet-
itiveness Act of 1990 (Competitiveness Act),38 also suggests that it would be
inappropriate to interpret the decisions of prior courts as giving a broad reading
to the exception. This bill codifies an expansive view of the exception,39 which
the Note will critique below. For the current analysis, however, the section of
the bill entitled "Applicability of Prior Substantive Law" supports the Note's
34. Id. at 863.
35. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2683 (1990).
36. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1307 (emphasis added).
37. This interpretation is supported by the Federal Circuit's holding in the Scripps case, discussed
below. In this case, decided after passage of the Restoration Act but before Medtronic, the court refused
to find experimental use despite the defendant's claim that its experimental activities were solely directed
at gaining FDA approval for its drug. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. See also Eli Lilly &
Co. v. A.H. Robbins Co., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 757, 760 (E.D. Va. 1985) (ruling that "[w]hile the evidence
is devoid of any commercial use of the [patented] product [in suit], it cannot be doubted that Robins' use
was solely for business reasons.").
38. H.R. 5598, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 401-403 (1990).
39. The bill states, in pertinent part, "It shall not be an act of infringement to make or use a patented
invention solely for research or experimentation purposes .... H.R. 5598, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. § 402
(1990). It should be noted that nowhere in the bill do the drafters define the phrase "solely for ...
experimental purposes."
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contention that prior experimental use case law does not support an expanded
application of the defense.'
The relevant section provides: "The substantive law in effect before the date
of the enactment of this Act shall apply to cases arising from research or
experimentation conducted before such date of enactment."'" Such a provision
by itself does not definitively prove that the prior case law does not encompass
an expanded experimental use application. But when viewed in conjunction with
the substantive directive of the bill,42 this provision illustrates that the drafters
recognized that the bill expands the scope of the previously existing law.
Moreover, the fact that the drafters did not advocate retroactive application of
the bill is indicative of their attempt to preserve the rights of those patentees
who acquired patents prior to the bill's consideration. After all, if the purpose
of the Competitiveness Act were solely to clarify the scope of the experimental
use exception (i.e., not change the substantive law in any way), there would
be no reason not to allow for retroactive application.
II. THE FALLACIES OF EXPANDED APPLICATION
A. A Critique of Arguments Advocating Expansion
Given the narrow contours of the case law, some commentators have argued
for a more expansive interpretation of the exception, which would allow
innovators to design around and improve upon existing patents. They maintain
that a broad experimental use exception is needed to sustain an acceptable level
of innovative activity.43 By and large, their arguments fail to consider the
disincentive effects a broad exception would have on innovation in those
industries that rely heavily on patent protection.
Eisenberg has noted that the patent law's requirement of an early enabling
disclosure (i.e., that the disclosure describe the invention with sufficient clarity
to permit one familiar with the relevant technology to build the invention)4 S
contemplates that "certain uses of patented inventions during the patent term
40. See Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 1556 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 464-66 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings] (acknowledging ambiguity in experimental use
case law). H.R. 1556 was the predecessor bill to H.R. 5598.
41. H.R. 5598, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 403(b) (1990).
42. See supra note 39.
43. See supra note 5.
44. See, e.g., 1988 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. REP. 25-28 (failing to mention
disincentive effects of broad experimental use).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) states (emphasis added):
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make




do not constitute patent infringement." 46 She reasons that "[i]f the public had
absolutely no right to make, use, or sell the patented invention until the end
of the patent term, it would be somewhat puzzling to require that the patentee
give the public an enabling disclosure of the invention at the beginning of the
patent term."47
Eisenberg's assertion that an early disclosure policy anticipates some uses
of the patented invention is understandable; some uses of the patented invention
do follow from the disclosure. For example, ascertaining the verity and exact-
ness of the specification, which falls under Justice Story's formulation, may
be one use arising from early disclosure. An enabling disclosure encourages
private parties to test the invention to determine whether it really does what
is claimed (that is, to check for verity). This private policing activity protects
against awarding invalid patents. In addition, by providing a technical descrip-
tion of a patented invention, enabling disclosures reduce the likelihood that
others will wastefully duplicate the research efforts of the patentee and inform
the public of the breadth of the patent protection---crucial information if other
inventors are to avoid infringing the patent. And, as noted by Eisenberg, those
descriptions contained in the disclosures give "the public access to those parts
of the specification that the patentee does not claim. ' 48
Although enabling disclosure requirements contemplate that some unlicensed
uses of patented inventions are acceptable, it is unjustified and inconsistent with
patent law to assume that these uses include experimental activity involving the
use and construction of a patented invention in a commercial attempt to develop
either a non-infringing alternative (design-around) or an improvement upon an
existing patent. Section 284 of the Patent Code guarantees to a successful
claimant "damages adequate to compensate for the use made of the invention
by the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable royalty,"49 thus
assuring a patentee of compensation even without a showing of actual pecuniary
loss. This provision evinces a policy of requiring all parties that use a patented
idea to pay the patentee for the privilege. According to this view, only those
uses that are totally beyond the range of commercial expectation should qualify
as non-infringing 0 As opposed to the acceptable uses that derive from early
disclosure, design-around attempts and improvement endeavors are not com-
pletely beyond the range of commercial expectation; the infringer, through her
utilization of the patentee's protected idea, engages in experimental activities
with an eye towards future profit.
46. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 219.
47. Id (emphasis original).
48. Id.
49. Emphasis added.
50. See Kaz Mfg. Co. v. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 317 F.2d 679, 680-81 n.3 (2d Cir. 1963) C"[O]ne
who constructs a patented wall safe but uses it only as an anchor for his boat would not be a patent infringer
since such a use would not be for the purpose of utilizing the teachings of the patent.").
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Israelsen has recently addressed the subject of experimental use and has
proposed a new framework within which to assess potentially infringing
activity. 1 This commentator suggests that the courts should interpret section
271(a), which defines infringement,52 in much the same way as they interpret
the "public use" and "on sale" bars of section 102(b). 53 Israelsen's suggested
framework is a novel one. Unfortunately, he fails to acknowledge key policy
differences behind section 102 and section 271(a)-differences that preclude
similar application of these two "experimental use" doctrines.
Section 102, by limiting the uses that can be made of an invention before
the filing of a patent application, encourages early public disclosure, which, in
turn, enhances the public interest by promoting the marketing of a steady stream
of innovations.' Underlying the early disclosure rationale is the oft-cited pre-
sumption that the quid pro quo for receiving a patent is that the inventor must
disclose her invention to the public.55 When interpreting section 102, courts
have ruled that a public use that primarily has an experimental purpose does
not create a section 102(b) bar to patentability.5 6 Thus, the courts have allowed
prospective patentees to experiment publicly with their inventions before
applying for patent protection. Such experimentation may be necessary for an
inventor to describe fully the characteristics of his invention, which, in turn,
facilitates the disclosure of the best mode of use for the invention, a disclosure
the patent laws require.5 7 Public experimentation helps to maximize public
disclosure of patented inventions, and the courts have accordingly utilized less
rigorous standards for a successful showing of experimental use in the section
102 context.
The underlying rationale for section 27 1(a) can be contrasted to demonstrate
the problem with Israelsen's suggestion. Section 271(a) ensures to an inventor
compensation for the unlicensed use, construction, or sale of her invention by
others. When a court issues an opinion on experimental use related to this
51. See Israelsen, supra note 5, at 475-78.
52. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
53. This section states, in pertinent part, that an inventor is not entitled to a patent if "the invention
was ... in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent in the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
54. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944) (public interest is dominant
in patent system); State Industries v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1234-35 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (function
of patent system is to "bring[] a steady flow of innovations to the market."); Chicago Steel Foundry Co.
v. Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 132 F.2d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1943) ("The issuance of patents is ... to
encourage discoveries which will benefit the people.") (emphasis added); see also F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRI-
AL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 440 (2d ed. 1980) (listing main reasons for granting
exclusive patent rights: "to promote invention, to encourage the development and commercial utilization
of inventions, and to encourage inventors to disclose their inventions to the public.") (emphasis added).
55. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 219; see also, Noonan, Understanding Patent Scope, 65 OR. L.
REV. 717, 722 (1986) ("A patent can be viewed as a contract between the public and the inventor in which
the inventor agrees to disclose his advances to the public in return for the right to exclusively use that
advance for seventeen years.") (footnote omitted).
56. See, e.g., Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877) (ruling that public, experimental testing
of new road pavement did not constitute public use).
57. See supra note 45.
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section, an issued patent already exists. A patentee presumably has disclosed
early and in a way that enables one skilled in the art to build the invention
claimed58 Hence, the courts' role is to determine whether to allow others to
engage in the unlicensed use of the patentee's protected idea. In doing so, the
courts must decide whether the experimental use by others will discourage
future inventors from utilizing patent protection (because of the potential for
competitors to experiment on the invention disclosed in the patent). The courts
must determine whether such use either is of so innocuous a character as not
to warrant injunctive relief and/or damages 9 or so overwhelmingly furthers
countervailing goals as to be permitted." In making this determination, the
courts must recognize that any use to which a patentee has not voluntarily
consented will dissuade future inventors from utilizing the patent system to
protect their ideas.
When the courts are called upon to evaluate experimental use in the context
of section 102, in contrast, they must necessarily conceptualize the issue
differently. Here the experimentation is conducted by the inventor himself in
an attempt to understand fully the scope of her invention. Thus, such experi-
mentation does not implicate the potential disincentive effects that accompany
experimentation in the section 27 1(a) context. Hence, a less restrictive experi-
mental use allowance in this context works to the advantage of both the inven-
tor and the public by enabling the inventor to make the most complete disclo-
sure possible and thus claim the broadest protection in the patent application.
B. Distinguishing Between Acceptable and Unacceptable Experimental Use
Allowing parties to construct and use a patented invention in an effort to
see whether it does what is claimed is consistent with patent law. First, this
type of use falls within the second prong of Justice Story's formulation, specifi-
cally, to ascertain the verity and exactness of the specification. Second, such
a use helps to ensure that the patent disclosure describes the invention in the
terms required by section 112, which directs that the specification be tailored
to those familiar with the relevant art. Last, this type of use encourages poten-
tial competitors to police their rivals, thereby reducing the number of invalid
patents that are issued and the corresponding social costs.61
Related to this policing function is another acceptable use, that is "compara-
tive testing against a patented invention to establish patentability of another
58. Id.
59. See cases cited supra note 23.
60. See Comment, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come,
8 Nw. 3. INT'L L. & Bus. 666 (1988) (discussing some common countervailing justifications given for
limiting patentee's right to exclude others, such as public health and national defense).
61. These costs include the R&D costs of others who expend resources in an attempt to invent around
invalid patents and the litigation costs of challenging validity.
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invention." 62 This use does not directly threaten the pecuniary interests of the
patentee and serves the useful function of allowing a potential patentee to
determine more readily whether prior art precludes his invention. This type of
experimental use also increases the probability that patent applications will
disclose patentable63 inventions and thereby reduces the administrative costs
attendant to Patent & Trademark Office review and rejection of patent applica-
tions. Use in this form also appears to fall within Justice Story's formulation.
Finally, it would appear that pure scientific research (i.e., that with no
foreseeable commercial implications), involving experimentation on a patented
invention to see how it works, also falls under Justice Story's formulation (i.e.,
philosophical experiments). Such noncommercial investigations of a patented
invention, engaged in solely to satisfy scientific curiosity, do not threaten the
potential gains that the patent grant safeguards for the patentee. At the same
time, this type of experimental activity is advantageous because it fosters the
quest to expand human knowledge.
Allowing parties seeking to develop commercially either useful improve-
ments or substitute technologies, i.e., design-arounds, to experiment on patented
inventions is not consistent with the policy of patent law. Commentators who
advocate an expanded exception fail to recognize that expansion would severely
limit the ability of the patent system, through its reward64 and prospect s
functions, to assure to a patentee the appropriability of returns on her invest-
ment of resources in research and development (R&D). As such, they fail to
realize that a broad experimental use exception, by discouraging inventors from
relying on the patent system, would decrease the level of public disclosure of
new inventions as well as reduce innovative activity in those industries that rely
on patent protection. A broad exception, rather than fostering innovation, would
have exactly the opposite effect.
An unlicensed appropriation of a patentee's protected ideas weakens his
control over his patented idea and deprives the patentee of some of the pecuni-
ary benefits protected by his patent rights. These commentators also fail to
value the contribution that the patentee may have made to the development of
his competitors' innovations. After all, but for the patentee's inventive efforts
and his willingness to disclose the fruits of those efforts, competitors would
not even be in a position to develop a noninfringing alternative or improvement.
62. Israelsen, supra note 5, at 475; see also id. at 473 & n.80.
63. To receive a patent, an applicant must demonstrate to the patent examiner that the invention claimed
meets the three criteria for patentability: novelty, utility, and non-obviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1988).
A successful showing of novelty demonstrates that the applicant was the first to make the invention. To
meet the utility requirement, an applicant must demonstrate that the invention is useful in some way. The
non-obviousness requirement ensures that an invention is more than a trivial advancement in the relevant
art (i.e., that it was not obvious to one sklled in the pertinent art). For a basic introduction to the operation
of the patent system, see P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 181-
88 (1988).
64. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
65. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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Allowing competitors to reap benefits from a patentee's inventive efforts
works against the reward theory of the patent system, which views the patent
as a device that "enables the inventor to capture the returns from his investment
in the invention, returns that would otherwise (absent secrecy) be subject to
appropriation by others."'66 Under this theory, it is the expectation of the
reward of the patent monopoly that encourages people to devote resources to
inventive endeavors in the first place. An expansive experimental use exception,
which threatens the patentee's potential for economic returns, would reduce
inventive activity, particularly in those industries that rely heavily on patent
protection.Y
The patent system has also been identified as serving a prospect function,
which complements its reward role.68 While the system provides a reward by
guaranteeing a return on capital for those resources already expended on R&D,
it also serves a prospect function by encouraging investors to devote capital
resources to R&D on projects that have a sound prospect of yielding commer-
cial returns in the future. The prospect theory of the patent system "conceives
of the process of technological innovation as one in which resources are
brought to bear upon an array of prospects, each with its own associated sets
of probabilities of costs and returns .... [A] prospect [is] a particular opportu-
nity to develop a known technological possibility."69 This view of the patent
system comports well with the fact that "many technologically important patents
... issueol long before commercial exploitation [becomes] possible." 70 It is
also in line with the understanding that substantial effort is required to trans-
form an invention into a marketable innovation.71
66. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 IL . & ECoN. 265, 266 (1977); see also
Chicago Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 132 F.2d 812 (7th Cir. 1943) (recognizing that
inventors seek patents for reward of patent monopoly).
67. The chemical, pharmaceutical, plastics, petroleum refining, and steel mill products industries have
been identified as industries that rely heavily on patent protection to secure returns on investment in R&D.
Levin, Klevorick, Nelson & Winter, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development,
in 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcnvrrY 783, 796-97 (1987) [hereinafter Appropriating Returns
from R&D]; accord Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SC. 173, 175(1986)
(pharmaceutical, chemical, and petroleum industries utilize patent protection substantially).
A reduction in patent protection would encourage use of trade secret protection and weaken the
incentive to invest in R&D in these industries.
68. See Kitch, supra note 66, at 266 passim.
69. Id. at 266.
70. Id. at 267. The transistor, radar, and television are a few prominent examples of patented inventions
that did not reach the market in commercially viable form until after patent expiration. See id. at 272 for
a more complete listing. See also DeBrock, Market Structure, Innovation, and Optimal Patent Life, 28 J.L.
& ECON. 223,227 (1985) ("patents are almost always granted after relatively little progress toward the final
innovation."). But see Beck, The Prospect Theory of the Patent System and UnderProductive Competition,
5 RES. L. & EcON. 193 (1983) (patent law does not protect all or even many future developments of
technology).
71. See supra note 7.
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The patent laws encourage early filing of applications; thus, when patented,
many inventions are far from being in commercially marketable form.72 The
prospect function of the patent system attracts investment in technological
innovation by guaranteeing to an inventor a seventeen year period in which
either to develop that technology into commercially viable form73 or to license
the invention to someone else to develop.74 From this perspective, the patent
system serves not so much to reward an inventor for coming up with a com-
mercial product that benefits society as to encourage investors to devote capital
to those R&D projects that look as though they will produce socially beneficial
products in the future (i.e., result in a beneficial innovation).75 A potential
investor will be less willing to direct her capital resources toward the develop-
ment of a new invention without at least some assurance of an unfettered
opportunity to develop that invention into a commercially viable innovati6n in
the future.
In addition to depriving a patentee of some compensation, an exemption
for commercial experimental activity would also work to dissuade inventors
from using patent law to protect their ideas, thus reducing the level of public
disclosure of new inventions.76 An expansive application of the experimental
use exception would encourage inventors to resort to state trade secret protec-
tion77 or perhaps no legal protection at all. For inventors who devise particu-
larly complex inventions, the time it takes for a competitor to "reverse engi-
neer"7" and subsequently manufacture and market a competing product may
72. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, 110 S. Ct. 2683, 2688 (1990) ("When an inventor makes a
potentially useful discovery, he normally protects it by applying for a patent at once. Thus... the 'clock'
on his patent term will be running even though he is not yet able to derive any profit from the invention.").
73. "Only in the case of a patented product is a firm able to make the expenditures necessary to bring
the advantages of the product to the attention of the customer without fear of competitive appropriation if
the product proves successful." Kitch, supra note 66, at 277.
74. It has been observed that "[e]fficient exploitation of a patent often requires patentees to license
users of their inventions." Note, An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms in Patent Licenses, 67 MINN. L
REV. 1198, 1200 (1983); see also id. at 1226 n.166 ("Small corporations often need licensing since they
lack the marketing organization necessary to commercialize an invention."); J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD,
INNOVATION & TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR THE GROWING FIRM 1 (1984) ("[Licensing] can be a central
part of the firm's innovation policy and as such is crucial to the firm's survival and growth in the long and
short term.").
75. Thus, the question for a court is not whether a discovery, in its current form, is worth the grant
of a seventeen year monopoly, but rather whether the information provided in the specification is worth
further investigation and development. See Kitch, supra note 66, at 284.
76. See Appropriating Returns from R&D, supra note 67, at 805, where the authors note that "[tihe
choice between obtaining a patent and maintaining secrecy may be influenced by the extent to which the
disclosures made in the patent document facilitate inventing around the patent." A broad experimental use
allowance would encourage inventing around patented inventions and thus would discourage reliance on
patent protection.
77. State trade secret laws allow firms to protect undisclosed industrial know-how from appropriation
by competing firms. Reliance on trade secret protection necessarily implies that the information to be
protected has not been revealed to the public. Such an option may be particularly appealing to the inventor
of, say, a new manufacturing process, which others could easily duplicate once disclosed but whose nature
is not revealed by the products that result from it.
78. Reverse engineering entails the deconstruction and analysis of a product or process to learn how
it is designed and assembled.
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offer greater protection than a patent law with a broad experimental use allow-
ance. The latter would permit sophisticated competitors to use the information
of the patent disclosure to experiment on the patented product in developing
improvements or superior alternatives.79 An expansive experimental use excep-
tion diminishes the patentee's ability to control the commercialization of her
patented invention and thus to appropriate the returns on her investment in the
R&D of the invention."0 If competitors are allowed to appropriate the patented
ideas of others for experimental purposes with a view toward developing
competing products, the level of innovation will not increase, as those calling
for a broad experimental use exception argue, but rather will decrease.8 1
A system with a broad experimental use allowance would have a disparate
impact on less well-financed inventors whose ability to conduct R&D may be
limited in the short term when they are not able to convince possible investors
of the potential commercial success of their patented inventions. If larger, well-
funded competitors are able to utilize the patented inventions of smaller inven-
tors to develop their own patented alternatives, these smaller inventors will be
less able to raise funds for R&D. The experimental use exception, thus, could
very well have a dampening effect on small scale, highly speculative R&D
inventive endeavors, which scholars have recognized as comprising a substantial
portion of the overall innovative activity in the United States. 2
79. See Schlicher, Some Thoughts on the Law and Economics of Licensing Biotechnology Patent and
Related Property Rights in the United States, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 263, 274 (1987)
(allowing competitors free access may lead inventors of microorganisms to shun patent protection).
80. Yu, Potential Competition and Contracting in Innovation, 24 J.L. & EcON. 215,237 (1981), notes
(emphasis added):
To the extent that the patent protects only a physical form of the idea rather than the idea itself,
inferior inventors can free ride by improving on the superior inventor's crude models ....
Consequently, returns to early research will be noncapturable. A "perfect" patent system presum-
ably can eliminate the problem by having the improvement inventor compensate the original
inventor.
Allowing the experimental use exception for design around attempts and improvement attempts, which
involves no compensation for the patentee, directly contradicts Yu's analysis.
81. See Letter from Dunald J. Quigg Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,
to Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier in Hearings, supra note 40, at 189-90 ("The Administration would
not favor legislation... codifying the experimental use... doctrine[], because it could diminish the strong
incentive [to innovate] provided by the patent system."). See also Note, supra note 74, at 1200 & n.11
(describing how uncertainty is significant deterrent to R&D).
A broad experimental use allowance is akin to a limited compulsory license at a zero royalty rate.
Compulsory licensing occurs when a court allows for the unlicensed use by others of a patented invention
at a judicially determined rate of compensation to the patentee. Historically, courts have rarely ordered
compulsory licensing. On the occasions that the courts have employed such a solution, they have done so
to remedy antitrust violations. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950);
United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ohio 1942).
82. After investigating the role of the small firm in the scheme of technological innovation, Scherer
concludes, "studies show that small firms.., continue to contribute significantly toward the creation of
new products and processes." F.M. SCHERER, supra note 54, at 416-17; See J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra
note 74, at 33 (reporting "that in the US ... firms with less than 1000 employees accounted for only 6%
of the total R&D spend [sic], but were responsible for 43% of innovation during the mid 1970s").
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C. Incentives to Share
In addition to failing to take into account the substantial negative effects
a broad exception would have on the reward and prospect functions of the
patent system, the arguments favoring an expansive application are based upon
false assumptions. These arguments implicitly assume that inventors under the
current patent regime lack adequate incentives to share the fruits of their
innovative activities with one another and that most patents confer substantial
market power on their holders. As the following discussion will demonstrate,
these two assumptions are incorrect, and therefore the underlying rationale of
those calling for an expanded reading of the exception is flawed.
Those calling for an expansive reading of the experimental use exception
have pointed to the possible reluctance of patentees to license their inventions
to competitors. 83 They claim that, in the absence of a commercially accessible
embodiment, a potential competitor "would have just two choices: (1) proceed
with the practice of the invention, thereby becoming an infringer and violating
the law; or (2) wait 17 years to move science forward in that area."s This
fear is unwarranted.
These commentators assume that companies lack significant incentives to
enter into agreements to share their inventions and innovations." Studies
demonstrate that firms frequently license patented technology to one another.86
n addition, theorists have suggested that firms will license minor innovations
to one another after development.87 The utilization of cross-licensing agree-
ments83 -whereby companies, before embarking on the potentially costly
development of an invention, agree to share with one another the results of their
83. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 225; Israelsen, supra note 5, at 474 n.82.
84. Israelsen, supra note 5, at 474-75. Israelsen is assuming that when an inventor receives a patent,
the invention already is in its commercially marketable form. But, as previously discussed, many important
innovations are patented in only a crude form, and it may take several more years of R&D to complete the
innovation process. See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
85. This assumption is not correct. See J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 74, at 45 (observing that
firm may license patents on technology it cannot itself exploit); Merges, supra note 7, at 868-69 ("Compet-
ing firms often cooperate in various ways to further mutual interests."); Note, supra note 74, at 1202 n.23
("Often licensees can produce or market an invention more efficiently than the patentee [who] may not have
the productive facilities to satisfy demand for a successful invention.").
86. See OJ. FIRESTONE, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PATENTS 70 (noting that "the figures suggest
that a rather large proportion of patented inventions are worked in Canada as a result of licensing agreements
concluded both between related and unrelated firms") (footnotes omitted); 3. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra
note 74, at 1 (observing that "[licensing] can be a central part of the firm's innovation policy and as such,
is crucial to the firm's survival"); Note, supra note 74; cf. Appropriating Returns from R&D, supra note
67, at 806 (reporting, after survey of upper-level R&D executives, that they rated "[l]icensing... on average
[as] an important way of gaining access to a rival's new technology")
87. Katz & Shapiro, On the Licensing of Innovations, 16 RAND J. ECON. 504 (1985); cf. Von Hippel,
Cooperation Between Rivals: Informal Know-How Trading. 16 RES. POt'Y 291 (1987) (finding high degree
of know-how trading in US steel "minimill" industry and possibly in many other industries).
88. See Katz, An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development, 17 RAND 3. ECON. 527 (1986)
(describing how royalty-free cross-licensing schemes can increase efficiency of industry-wide R&D).
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research efforts-contests such an assumption. 9 Firms cross-license and enter
patent pools9° because they fear that they will be second to come up with a
drastic (i.e., market defining) innovation9 and thus will be shut out of the
market if they do not have guaranteed access to the innovation before its
development.92 Firms would rather risk losing possible monopolistic profits
by contracting with each other than be excluded by a more efficient innovator's
patent monopoly. The innovation process is not strictly one of exclusive
competition, as those who call for expansive application of the experimental
use exception implicitly suggest, but rather "[tihe innovation process involves
a mix of competition in research and cooperative agreements to share the
information gained from research." 93
Another invalid premise of the arguments supporting expansive application
of the exception is that a patent right necessarily confers inordinate market
power on the patentee. But, this degree of power does not result from most
patents94 because a patentee's market power is greatly contingent upon other
factors like the substitutability of other products or processes for the patented
invention.95 Even for a patentee who refuses ex ante to cross-license or patent
pool, the existence of a high cross elasticity of demand (i.e., the ready availabil-
ity of acceptable substitutes) for the final innovation may induce the inventor
ex post to license the innovation to competitors. Thus, arguments based upon
a fear of inordinate market power fail adequately to account for other variables
that may affect a patentee's actual market power.
89. After studying the licensing behavior of Canadian firms, one author observed that "[t]he data
suggest that cross-licensing is becoming increasingly accepted as a method of obtaining access to the patents
held by other firms." OJ. FIRnsTONE, supra note 86, at 76. That author also noted "that cross-licensing
in Canada is a much more common practice among patentees from the United States... as compared with
that followed by patentees of other countries... Id; see also F.M. SCHERER, supra note 54, at 452
("Cross-licensing is a constructive means of avoiding stalemates between complementary patent portfolios.");
Yu, supra note 80, at 234-36 (discussing incentive to create private agreements between inventors to share
innovations, emphasizing role of cross-licensing and patent pools).
90. In a patent pool, "rights to important technology are contributed to a pool from which all industry
members may draw." Merges, supra note 7, at 869.
91. See id. at 868 (noting that "most [firms] are 'risk averse' [and] take licenses to preserve a delicate
balance of relations within an industry or to assure future licensing by rivals") (footnote omitted); Scherer,
The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing, in 2 FIN. AND ECON. 19 (Monograph series 1977)
(reporting that "[t]here is... evidence from numerous studies of capital market behavior that firms are on
average risk averse").
92. In their study of the licensing behavior of small and medium sized enterprises, Lowe and Crawford
report that "grant backs and grant forwards were fairly common." J. LowE & N. CRAWFoRD, supra note
74, at 177 (footnote omitted). The authors note that "[g]rant backs/forwards denote those cases where licens-
ees/licensors are obliged to divulge any developments of the technology to their licensors." Id.
93. Gallini & Winter, Licensing in the Theory of Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECoN. 237 (1985).
94. See F.M. SCHERER, supra note 54, at446 ("[Flew patents are sufficiently basic and broad to 'fence
in' a field altogether."); Klitzke, Refusal to License: Monopolization Problems For Patent Owners, 65 OL
L. REV. 745, 757 (1986) ('The vast majority of issued patents are for improvements over existing products
and processes. The owner of an improvement patent does not have full control over market prices [and]
may have little market power....")
95. See Klitzke, supra note 94, at 749 (1986) ("[Slubstitutability is measured by the cross-elasticity
of demand, which is the degree of change in demand as the price changes.").
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III. AN APPROPRIATE COMPROMISE-LIMITED EXPERIMENTAL USE
As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, neither law nor policy
supports a broad experimental use exception. However, to evaluate thoroughly
the proper breadth of the exception, one must consider all possible market
scenarios, including those in which a patent confers market power, and the
holder of such a "pioneer patent ' 96 has the opportunity to utilize his patent
rights to stifle the innovative activities of others. Patents are utilized extensively
in the pharmaceutical industry97 and are more likely to yield a high degree
of market power98 over a good with inelastic demand.99 No doubt, for exam-
ple, that when a cure for AIDS is developed, those with the disease will pay
"whatever it takes" to gain access to the cure.t°0
A recent case frequently noted by commentators advocating expansive
application of the exception, Scripps Clinic v. Genentech, Inc.,101 involved
a party with an inordinate amount of market power. This lawsuit involved a
patented protein, Factor VIII:C, which is instrumental in the blood-clotting
process and is used in the treatment of hemophilia. Plaintiff Scripps held a
patent covering both a method for purifying Factor VIII:C from blood plasma
and for a purified form of Factor VIII:C. Defendant Genentech used Scripps'
purified Factor VIII:C to determine its amino acid sequence so that Genentech
would be able to clone the Factor VIII:C gene. This would enable it to produce
the protein through recombinant DNA processes, which would not infringe
Scripps' purification patent. The trial court found Genentech's use of purified
Factor VIII:C, in its attempt to develop a non-infringing alternative to Scripps'
purification patent, to be an unauthorized use under section 271(a). 1 2
Scripps can be interpreted as a case in which a patentee, who exercised
considerable market power because it held a patent on a product that has no
substitute, was able to hinder the development of a non-infringing alternative
that most assuredly would have lowered the price of the product to the public,
96. See id. at 758 ("Pioneer patents initially protected the high prices of the first electronic calculators
and video cassette recorders, until competitors were able to invent around the patents or the original patents
expired.").
97. See Appropriating Returnsfrom R&D, supra note 67, at 796 (noting that managers in drug industry
rated patents as effective way to capture returns on both pharmaceutical products and processes); see also
F.M. SCHERER, supra note 54, at 448 ("[W]ithout effective patent protection, R&D expenditures would be
reduced... by 64 percent in pharmaceuticals (where imitation in the absence of patents [is] expected to
be especially swift and effective).") (footnote omitted).
98. One author has noted that "[s]ome of the most extreme cases [of resource misallocation due to the
patent system] concern the pricing of patented pharmaceutical items, for which demand is typically quite
inelastic over a considerable price range." F.M. SCHERER, supra note 54, at 450.
99. "T]he rate of decrease in sales in response to an increase in the firm's price ... is the firm's
elasticity of demand." P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, supra note 63, t 340, at 569 n.16 (emphasis in original).
100. This phenomenon is occurring currently, to some degree, with the AIDS drug, AZT. See L.A.
Times, Oct. 14, 1989, at 18, col 1 (reporting call by Bush Administration for lower AIDS drug prices);
see also AZT Blazed the Trail for High-Priced Drugs, Seattle Times, Apr. 19, 1990, at El.
101. 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
102. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988); 666 F. Supp. at 1401.
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thereby increasing its availability. Although this type of situation is disturbing,
an indiscriminately applied experimental use exception is an inappropriate
remedy.
A broad experimental use allowance, like that provided for in the recently
proposed Competitiveness Act," is overinclusive and would result in a de-
crease in innovative activity. This Note suggests that more particularized
solutions be used to strike an appropriate compromise. 1" One solution is that
Congress use its investigative resources to develop or commission a set of
specific guidelines to determine the conditions under which experimental use
is appropriate. These guidelines, which could be established by the Office of
Technology Assessment or the Patent and Trademark Office should set out
threshold conditions, which may vary among industries, that must be demon-
strated for the exception "to attach." Thus, proper guidelines could be devel-
oped by market power tests that are industry specific.10 5 These guidelines
could then be used in infringement suits, whereby the defendant/competitor
refers to the specific conditions to demonstrate that experimental use is justified.
Any weakening of the patent monopoly will discourage inventors from
utilizing patent protection. If developed properly, however, the benefits from
market power tests should outweigh this possible effect. Properly designed
market power guidelines could strike a sensible balance between the right of
an innovator to appropriate adequate returns on investment and that of the
public to a steady flow of innovation. This desirable balancing effect would be
most evident in those industries, like the drug industry, which rely heavily on
patent protection. The returns attendant to control of a drug for which there is
inelastic demand should still encourage drug innovators to utilize patent protec-
tion even if experimental use is permitted. In addition, drug innovators will still
want to protect themselves during the lag-time before successful development
and marketing of a non-infringing alternative.
In setting its priorities for which industries to target first for the develop-
ment of market power guidelines, Congress could target for guideline develop-
ment those industries that are of particular economic or social significance. 101
103. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
104. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 is a recent example of a
narrowly tailored experimental use allowance, which addresses a specific problem (i.e., regulatory approval
for medical devices). See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
105. See Appropriating Returns from R&D, supra note 67, at 816 ('IThe incremental effects of policy
changes should be assessed at the industry level."); see also id. at 818 ("Since the impact of legal protection
of intellectual property depends on the strength of other appropriability mechanisms and varies widely among
industries, focused efforts to solve problems in specific markets would be... prudent....').
106. This focus parallels the "public interese' rationale used to justify the compulsory licensing of
"inventions relating to public health, welfare, or national defense-areas where the inventor's interest may
be subordinate to that of the public." Comment, supra note 60, at 670. As mentioned above, supra note
81, the experimental use exception is akin to a compulsory license. See F.M. SCHERER, supra note 54, at
455, where that author notes: "In many nations no patent protection is given for drug entities, other chemical
compounds, and foodstuffs. This is ostensibly done to protect the public from monopolistic exploitation on
the purchase of vital staples."
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For example, currently in the United States, the Clean Air Act provides for the
compulsory licensing of patents on pollution control devices to those parties
who cannot use substitutes to meet the pollution guidelines of the statute.1°7
Another suggested alternative is that Congress empower the courts to
employ a modified experimental use exception whereby an inventor is paid a
"reasonable royalty" by those who experiment on her patented innovation. This
type of scheme treats experimental use as a type of limited compulsory licens-
ing, whereby the experimenting party is recognized as having a limited license
to experiment on a patented invention. In return for this privilege, the experi-
menter pays a royalty to the patentee. Under this paradigm, the royalty payment
required from the experimenter could be tied to the commercial success of any
innovation resulting from the experimental activity on the patented invention.
An experimenter would only have to compensate the patentee when the experi-
mental activity actually resulted in a benefit to the experimenter (thus, allowing
"pure" scientific research to continue unhindered). Because experimental use
will only dissuade an inventor from utilizing patent protection to the extent that
an experimenting party is able to develop a competing product, a properly
administered reasonable royalty regime should strike an optimal balance
between the inventor's desire to appropriate the returns on her investment in
R&D and the public's desire for a steady flow of innovations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The policies that underlie the patent laws and the behavior of firms that
engage in innovation do not justify adoption of a broad experimental use
exception. A liberal experimental allowance not only frustrates the reward and
prospect functions of the patent laws but fails to recognize the incentives that
firms have to license their patented technology to one another. Rather than
spurring increased innovative activity, a broad experimental use exception
would have just the opposite effect. In those rare cases in which a patentee is
able to monopolize the use of a specific technology and thus stifle the innova-
tive impulses of others, focused solutions are needed-solutions that respond
to the empirical realities of the innovative process.
In cases like Scripps, for example, the public interest in developing a less expensive way to produce
Factor VIII:C for hemophiliacs supports allowing others to experiment on the patented invention in an
attempt to develop non-infringing alternatives or improvements. That a patentee will be able to enjoy
commercial monopoly power will help to minimize the expected decrease in the frequency with which patent
protection is initially sought.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1989). Additionally, the Canadian Patent Act allows for compulsory
licensing of patents that apply to food preparation and patents on medicines. See Hayhurst, Food for
Thought: Compulsory Licensing of Patents, 1 INTELL. PROP. J. 73 (1984).
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